# A Proof Theorist's Guide to First Aid CUT-Elimination and Other Results of Classical Proof Theory

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# A Question for You

When are correct proofs also "bad" proofs?

# Sequents

#### Definition

If  $\Gamma$  and  $\Delta$  are finite sequences of logical formulas, then  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  is a sequent. The sequences  $\Gamma$  and  $\Delta$  are, respectively, the antecedent and succedent of the sequent and either may be empty.

The intended meaning of a sequent  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  is that if all the formulas in the antecedent are true, then at least one formula in the succedent is true.

#### Definition

An axiom is a non-emtpy sequent of the form  $\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi$  where  $\varphi$  is a logical formula.

# Rules of Inference

#### Definition (Operational Rules)

$$\frac{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{(\varphi \land \psi), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \land L_1 \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, (\varphi \land \psi)} \land R$$

$$\frac{\psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{(\varphi \land \psi), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \land L_2 \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, (\varphi \land \psi)} \lor R_1$$

$$\frac{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{(\varphi \land \psi), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \lor L \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, (\varphi \lor \psi)} \lor R_2$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{(\varphi \lor \psi), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \lor L \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, (\varphi \lor \psi)} \lor R_2$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{(\varphi \to \psi), \Gamma, \Delta \Rightarrow \Theta, \Lambda} \to L \qquad \frac{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, (\varphi \to \psi)} \to R$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{\neg \varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \neg L \qquad \frac{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \neg \varphi} \neg R$$

# Rules of Inference Continued

#### Definition (Operational Rules Continued)

$$\frac{\varphi(t), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\forall x \, \varphi(x), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \, \forall \mathsf{L} \\ \hspace*{1.5cm} ! \, \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi(a)}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \forall x \, \varphi(x)} \, \forall \mathsf{R}$$

$$! \, \frac{\varphi(a), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\exists x \, \varphi(x), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \, \exists \mathsf{L} \qquad \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi(t)}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \exists x \, \varphi(x)} \, \exists \mathsf{R}$$

In the inference rules above, the formulas occurring in  $\Gamma$ ,  $\Theta$ ,  $\Delta$ , and  $\Lambda$  are called side formulas. The remaining formulas in the premise(s) are called auxiliary formulas and the remaining formulas in the conclusion are called principal formulas.

# Rules of Inference Continued

#### Definition (Structural Rules)

$$\begin{array}{ll} \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \, \text{WL} & \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi} \, \text{WR} \\ \\ \frac{\varphi, \varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \, \text{CL} & \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi, \varphi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi} \, \text{CR} \\ \\ \frac{\Delta, \varphi, \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta}{\Delta, \psi, \varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta} \, \text{IL} & \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \psi, \varphi, \Lambda}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi, \psi, \Lambda} \, \text{IR} \\ \\ \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta, \varphi}{\Gamma, \Delta \Rightarrow \Theta, \Lambda} \, \text{CUT} \end{array}$$

Formulas appearing in  $\Gamma$ ,  $\Theta$ ,  $\Delta$ , and  $\Lambda$  will again be called side formulas. The remaining formulas are called principal formulas. Structural rules do not have auxiliary formulas. The principal formula of a CUT inference will be called the CUT-formula of the inference.

# LK Proofs

#### Definition (LK Proofs)

A proof in LK is a finite tree of sequents where the leaf nodes are axioms and all other nodes in the tree follow from the node(s) immediately above by a rule of inference. A sequent  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  is provable in LK if it is the root node of some LK proof. A formula  $\varphi$  is provable in LK if the sequent  $\Rightarrow\varphi$  is provable in LK.

# The Subformula Property

We will think of proofs utilizing CUT as "unhealthy" in some sense, while CUT-free proofs will have a number of nice properties. The most useful for us will be the following:

#### Lemma (The Subformula Property)

Let  $\pi$  be a CUT-free proof with end-sequent  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  and let  $\Theta\Rightarrow\Lambda$  be any sequent occurring in  $\pi$ . Then every formula in  $\Theta,\Lambda$  occurs as a sub-formula of some formula in  $\Gamma,\Delta$ .

We will use the Subformula Property and the equivalence of LK with LK-CUT to establish the consistency of LK.


# The Consistency of LK

#### Corollary (LK is Consistent)

If LK is equivalent to LK-CUT, then there is no formula  $\varphi$  such that both  $\varphi$  and  $\neg \varphi$  are provable in LK.

#### Proof.

If there were such a formula  $\varphi$  with proofs  $\pi_1$  and  $\pi_2$  of  $\varphi$  and  $\neg \varphi$ , respectively, then there would also be a proof of the empty sequent:



From this we could obtain a CUT-free proof of the empty sequent, but such a proof can consist only of empty sequents by The Subformula Property. Contradiction.

#### Theorem

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#### Definition (MIX)

We define a new structural rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Theta \qquad \Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda}{\Gamma, \Delta^* \Rightarrow \Theta^*, \Lambda} \, \mathsf{MIX}$$

where  $\Delta$  and  $\Theta$  are both assumed to contain at least one occurrence of a given formula  $\varphi$ , the MIX-formula of the inference, and  $\Delta^*$  and  $\Theta^*$  are obtained from  $\Delta$  and  $\Theta$ , respectively, by removing all occurrences of  $\varphi$ .

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#### Lemma

A sequent  $\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$  is provable in LK iff it is provable in LK-CUT+MIX

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#### Proof.

We will proceed by showing that it is always possible to remove, say, the topmost, leftmost MIX. The result then follows by induction on the number of MIX inferences occurring in the proof. Since we can focus our attention on sub-proofs containing a single MIX inference as their last inference, we can actually just focus on proofs of this form.

### The Proof

#### Lemma

If  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  has a proof in LK-CUT+MIX containing exactly one MIX inference as its last inference, then  $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$  has a proof in LK-CUT.

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#### Proof (Sketch).

We will associate to our proof a pair of natural numbers and then "push" the MIX inference upwards through the tree. As we do this we will sometimes obtain new MIX inferences, but the sub-proofs ending in these new MIX inferences will have associated to them pairs of natural numbers which are less in the lexicographic ordering than the pair we started with. Induction then takes over and we are done. Essentially we "push" our MIX inferences upwards until we have "pushed" them all the way out of our tree.

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- Define the degree  $d(\pi)$  of  $\pi$  to be the degree of the MIX-formula of  $\pi$ 's MIX inference.
- Define the left rank  $rk_l(\pi)$  of  $\pi$  to be the maximum number of consecutive sequents which each contain the MIX formula in their succedent and constitute a path terminating in the left premise of the MIX. Define the right rank  $rk_r(\pi)$  of  $\pi$  similarly.

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- Define the rank  $rk(\pi)$  of  $\pi$  to be  $rk_l(\pi) + rk_r(\pi)$ .

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- Define the rank  $rk(\pi)$  of  $\pi$  to be  $rk_l(\pi) + rk_r(\pi)$ .

Our proof then will be by induction on pairs  $(d(\pi), r(\pi))$  ordered lexicographically.

Consider the following proof  $\pi$  where F(x) is atomic:

We have  $d(\pi)=1$  since the MIX-formula,  $\exists x\, F(x)$ , has only one logical symbol. We also have  $rk(\pi)=\frac{rk_l(\pi)}{rk_r(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{rk_r(\pi)}=\frac{1}{rk_l(\pi)}+\frac{1}{$ 

Our first step will be to push the MIX upwards past the IL inference to reduce the right rank while keeping the degree and left rank fixed.

This results in

$$\frac{F(t)\Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t)\Rightarrow \boxed{\exists x}F(x)}_{1}}{\exists R} \exists R \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \exists xF(x) \\ \neg \exists xF(x), \boxed{\exists xF(x)}_{3}\Rightarrow \\ \neg \exists xF(x), \boxed{\exists xF(x)}_{3}\Rightarrow \\ \neg \exists xF(x), \boxed{\exists xF(x)}_{2}\Rightarrow G(s) \end{vmatrix} \mathsf{WR}} \frac{A(s)\Rightarrow G(s)}{\begin{bmatrix} \exists xF(x) \\ \exists xF(x) \end{bmatrix}_{3}, G(s)\Rightarrow G(s)} \mathsf{WL} \\ \neg \exists xF(x), \boxed{\exists xF(x) \\ \neg \exists xF(x) \lor G(s), \boxed{\exists xF(x)}_{1}\Rightarrow G(s) \\ F(t), \neg \exists xF(x) \lor G(s)\Rightarrow G(s) \end{vmatrix}} \mathsf{VL} \\ d(\pi) = 1 \\ rk(\pi) = \frac{rk_{l}(\pi)}{rk_{r}(\pi)} + \frac{rk_{r}(\pi)}{rk_{r}(\pi)} = \frac{1+4=5}{rk_{r}(\pi)}$$

Our next step will be to push our MIX inference up past the  $\lor L$  inference.

Since  $\vee L$  has two premises we obtain a proof with two MIX inferences. However, in each of the corresponding sub-proofs the right ranks will be less than before and the degrees and left ranks will stay the same:

$$\pi_1 \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \frac{\left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_3 \Rightarrow \exists x \, F(x)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_2 \Rightarrow} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1} \Rightarrow G(s) \\ \frac{\left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_2, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)} \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow G(s)}{G(s), \left[\frac{\exists x \, F(x)}{\exists x \, F(x)}\right]_1 \Rightarrow$$

We push our MIX inferences upwards again to reduce the ranks of our sub-proofs:

$$\pi_{\mathsf{I}} \bigg\{ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t) \Rightarrow \boxed{\exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}} \exists \mathsf{R} \frac{\boxed{\exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}} \Rightarrow \exists x \, F(x)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), \boxed{\exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}} \Rightarrow} \neg \mathsf{L} \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}}_{F(t), \neg \exists x \, F(x) \Rightarrow G(s)} \exists \mathsf{R} \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t), \neg \exists x \, F(x) \Rightarrow G(s)}}_{F(t), \neg \exists x \, F(x) \Rightarrow G(s)} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t) \Rightarrow \exists x \, F(x)}}_{F(t), \neg \exists x \, F(x) \Rightarrow G(s)} \exists \mathsf{R} \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{G(s), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{G(s), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}_{\mathsf{I}}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)}, G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)}_{\mathsf{I}} \sqcup \underbrace{\frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{\neg \exists x \,$$

Now we can eliminate one of the MIX inferences entirely and reduce the rank of the other:

$$\pi_1 \begin{cases} \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow F(t)}{F(t) \Rightarrow \boxed{\exists x \, F(x)}_1} \, \exists \mathbb{R} \\ \\ \frac{F(t) \Rightarrow \boxed{\exists x \, F(x)}_1}{\neg \exists x \, F(x)} \, \neg \mathbb{L} \\ \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \mathsf{WR} \\ \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \mathsf{WL} \\ \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \mathsf{UL} \\ \end{cases} \\ d(\pi_1) = 1 \\ rk(\pi_1) = rk_l(\pi_1) + rk_r(\pi_1) = 1 + 1 = 2$$

Finally, we remove the remaining MIX inference.

$$\frac{ F(t) \Rightarrow F(t) }{F(t) \Rightarrow \exists x \, F(x)} \exists \mathsf{R} \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \forall \mathsf{R} \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)}{\neg \exists x \, F(x), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \forall \mathsf{R} \\ \frac{\neg \exists x \, F(x) \lor G(s), F(t) \Rightarrow G(s)}{F(t), \neg \exists x \, F(x) \lor G(s) \Rightarrow G(s)} \, \mathsf{IL} \\$$

# Peano Arithmetic

We work in the signature  $\{0,s,+,\cdot\}$ . We obtain the system **PA** by adding to LK a rule of inference for induction

$$\mathop{!}\frac{\varphi(a),\Gamma\Rightarrow\Theta,\varphi(s(a))}{\varphi(0),\Gamma\Rightarrow\Theta,\varphi(t)}\mathop{\rm CJ}$$

and admitting as axioms the following sequents:

$$\begin{array}{llll} \mathsf{PA1} \ \Rightarrow t = t & \mathsf{PA6} \ s(t_1) = s(t_2) \Rightarrow t_1 = t_2 \\ \mathsf{PA2} \ t_1 = t_2 \Rightarrow t_2 = t_1 & \mathsf{PA7} \ \Rightarrow t + 0 = t \\ \mathsf{PA3} \ t_1 = t_2, t_2 = t_3 \Rightarrow t_1 = t_3 & \mathsf{PA8} \ \Rightarrow t_1 + s(t_2) = s(t_1 + t_2) \\ \mathsf{PA4} \ s(t) = 0 \Rightarrow & \mathsf{PA9} \ \Rightarrow t \cdot 0 = 0 \\ \mathsf{PA5} \ t_1 = t_2 \Rightarrow s(t_1) = s(t_2) & \mathsf{PA10} \ \Rightarrow t_1 \cdot s(t_2) = s(t_1 \cdot t_2) + t_1 \end{array}$$

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Our strategy to proving that **PA** is consistent will proceed from two ideas:

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Our strategy to proving that **PA** is consistent will proceed from two ideas:

① Sequents like  $\Rightarrow 5+2=2+5$  should always be provable without using quantifiers or induction. In fact, we should be able to produce proofs of these sorts of sequents without using any operational rules.

# The Big Idea

Our strategy to proving that **PA** is consistent will proceed from two ideas:

- ① Sequents like  $\Rightarrow 5+2=2+5$  should always be provable without using quantifiers or induction. In fact, we should be able to produce proofs of these sorts of sequents without using any operational rules.
- 2 Proofs with sequents containing only atomic sentences should never have  $\Rightarrow 0=1$  as an end-sequent.

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In the consistency proof for **PA**, simple proofs will be the analogues of CUT-free proofs:

- In LK we could not find CUT-free proofs of both  $\varphi$  and  $\neg \varphi$  and in **PA** we will not be able to find a simple proof of 0=1.
- In LK we could transform any proof into a CUT-free proof of the same end-sequent and in PA we will be able to transform any proof with end-sequent containing only atomic sentences into a simple proof of the same end-sequent.

# Consistency of Simple Proofs

#### Definition

Define the value val(t) of a closed term t recursively as follows:

- val(0) = 0
- val(s(t)) = val(t) + 1
- val(r+t) = val(r) + val(t)
- $val(r \cdot t) = val(r) \cdot val(t)$

An atomic sentence r=t is true if val(r)=val(t), and false otherwise. A sequent containing only atomic sentences is true if there is a false sentence in its antecedent or a true sentence in its succedent.

#### Lemma

Every sequent in a simple proof is true. In particular, there is no simple proof with end-sequent  $\Rightarrow 0 = 1$ .

# Existence of Certain Simple Proofs

The following will be useful when removing CJ inferences from our proofs:

#### Lemma

Let t be a closed term and val(t)=n. Then there is a simple proof with end-sequent  $\Rightarrow t=n$ .

### Proof (Sketch).

Induction. Lots and lots of induction. The proof is made considerably easier if we add as axioms to **PA** the sequents

$$r = t, u = v \Rightarrow r + u = t + v \text{ and } r = t, u = v \Rightarrow r \cdot u = t \cdot v.$$

If the terms involved in these sequents are taken to be closed, then it is easy to verify that the sequents are true and the lemma above regarding the consistency of simple proofs remains true.

## The Almost Simple Part

Given a proof in **PA** with end-sequent containing only atomic sentences there will be part of the proof that "looks like a simple proof." This part of the proof will contain

- The end-sequent.
- Some other stuff immediately above the end-sequent which "looks simple."

Our goal is to transform the proof so that this part expands to include the entire proof. We make precise the notion of "looks like a simple proof."

## Successors and Predecessors

### **Definition**

Let I be an inference in a proof  $\pi$ ,  $\varphi$  be a formula appearing in the conclusion of I, and  $\psi$  be a formula appearing in a premise of I. Then  $\varphi$  is the successor of  $\psi$  (and  $\psi$  is a predecessor of  $\varphi$ ) if one of the following holds:

- Both  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are corresponding occurrences of the same formula appearing in the side formulas of I.
- I is an operational inference with principal formula  $\varphi$  and auxiliary formula  $\psi$ .
- I is either a contraction or interchange and  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are the same formula.
- I is a CJ inference and  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  are the principal and auxiliary formulas in the succedents (antecedents), respectively.

## **Bundles and Boundaries**

### Definition

Let  $\pi$  be a proof and  $\varphi_0,\ldots,\varphi_n$  be a sequence of formulas appearing in  $\pi$  such that  $\varphi_0$  has no predecessor,  $\varphi_{i+1}$  is the successor of  $\varphi_i$  for i< n, and  $\varphi_n$  has no successor. Such a sequence is called a bundle. A bundle  $\varphi_0,\ldots,\varphi_n$  is implicit if  $\varphi_n$  is a CUT-formula and explicit otherwise. An inference in  $\pi$  is implicit if its principal formula belongs to an implicit bundle and is explicit otherwise. Lowermost implicit operational inferences are called boundary inferences.

Note that if  $\varphi_0,\ldots,\varphi_n$  is an explicit bundle, then  $\varphi_n$  is a formula appearing in the end-sequent of  $\pi$ .

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In the case of proofs with end-sequents containing only atomic sentences, all operational inferences must be implicit and so boundary inferences turn out to be lowermost operational inferences. Thus the end-part of such a proof "looks simple": it contains only structural and CJ inferences.

# Expanding the End-part

We will successively apply three different reduction steps to expand the end-parts our proofs. These are:

- Removal of CJ inferences
- 2 Removal of weakenings
- Reduction of CUTs

The second sort of reduction is needed for technical reasons which we will comment on later. For now we focus our attention on steps 1 and 2.

Suppose  $\pi$  is a proof with end-sequent containing only atomic sentences and that there is a CJ inference in the end-part of  $\pi$ . Then there is a lowermost such CJ inference and we may assume that its principal formula  $\varphi(t)$  is a sentence. So t is a closed term and val(t) is defined. Suppose val(t)=n and consider the sub-proof of  $\pi$  ending in this lowermost CJ inference of the end-part:

$$\vdots \pi'(a) \\ \vdots \\ \frac{\varphi(a) \Rightarrow \varphi(s(a))}{\varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(t)} \operatorname{CJ}$$

We will replace the above sub-proof with what are essentially several copies of the proof above the CJ inference.

Consider the following proof  $\pi''(n)$ :

$$\begin{array}{c} \vdots \pi'(0) & \vdots \pi'(1) \\ \vdots \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(1) & \varphi(1) \Rightarrow \varphi(2) \\ \hline \frac{\varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(2)}{\varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(2)} \text{ CUT } & \vdots \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(3) & \vdots \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(n-1) & \varphi(n-1) \Rightarrow \varphi(n) \\ \hline \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(n) & \vdots \\ \end{array}$$

Since val(t)=n, there is a simple proof of  $\Rightarrow t=n$  and we can use this to build a proof of  $\varphi(n)\Rightarrow \varphi(t)$  without CJ inferences or complex CUTs. Taking a CUT of this with  $\pi''(n)$  gives us a way to remove the CJ inference.

$$\frac{ \begin{array}{ccc} \vdots & \pi''(n) & & \vdots \\ \vdots & & & \vdots \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(n) & \varphi(n) \Rightarrow \varphi(t) \\ \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(t) & \end{array} \mathsf{CUT}$$

So if we replace

$$\vdots \pi'(a) \\ \vdots \\ \varphi(a) \Rightarrow \varphi(s(a)) \\ \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(t) \\ \text{CJ}$$

with the proof just constructed, we remove a CJ inference. But what else happens?



Looking at  $\pi''(n)$  again we see that we have essentially introduced n+1 new copies of  $\pi'(a)$  to our proof.

$$\begin{array}{c|c} \vdots \pi'(0) & \vdots \pi'(1) \\ \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(1) & \varphi(1) \Rightarrow \varphi(2) \\ \hline \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(2) & \text{CUT} \\ \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(3) \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(n-1) & \varphi(n-1) \Rightarrow \varphi(n) \\ \hline \hline \varphi(0) \Rightarrow \varphi(n) & \text{CUT} \\ \hline \end{array}$$


So any part of the end-part of  $\pi$  contained in  $\pi'(a)$  is reproduced n+1 times and we may end up introducing more CJ inferences to the end-part of our proof than we remove.

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
Let  $\pi$  be a proof with end-sequent containing only atomic sentences. An induction chain in  $\pi$  is a sequence  $I_0,\ldots,I_k$  where each  $I_j$  is a CJ inference in the end-part of  $\pi$ ,  $I_{j+1}$  occurs below  $I_j$ , no CJ inference occurs between  $I_{j+1}$  and  $I_j$ , and no CJ inference occurs below  $I_k$ . We take  $m(\pi)$  to be the maximum length among induction chains in  $\pi$  and  $o(\pi)$  to be the number of induction chains in  $\pi$  of length  $m(\pi)$ .

In the procedure described above for removing CJ inferences we can always choose to remove a CJ inference which is the last term of an induction chain of maximal length. When we do this, any new induction chains introduced are of length strictly shorter so either the number of induction chains of maximal length decreases by 1, or the maximal length of induction chains in  $\pi$  decreases.

After applying the first two reduction steps it is not difficult to show that if our proof is not simple, then the end-part contains a complex CUT where both CUT-formulas descend from boundary inferences. For instance, if the CUT-formula is  $\neg \varphi$ , then sub-proof ending in the complex CUT would look like the following where dashed lines indicate boundary inferences:



We replace the sub-proof above with the following:




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
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Once again we need to show that if we continue applying our reduction procedures, then we will eventually reach a proof to which our reduction procedures cannot be applied. Such a proof will be a simple proof and our argument will be complete. We induct on the ordinal  $\varepsilon_0$ :

$$\varepsilon_0 = \sup\{\omega_n(0) : n < \omega\}$$

where  $\omega_n(\alpha)$  is given by

$$\omega_0(\alpha) = \alpha$$

$$\omega_{n+1}(\alpha) = \omega^{\omega_n(\alpha)}$$

for  $\alpha$  an ordinal. So  $\varepsilon_0$  is the limit of the sequence  $0,\omega^0,\omega^{\omega^0},\omega^{\omega^0},\dots$ 

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- **6** If I is a CJ inference with premise S and  $o(S,\pi)$  has Cantor Normal Form  $\omega^{\alpha_0}+\cdots+\omega^{\alpha_n}$ , then  $o(I,\pi)=\omega^{\alpha_0+1}$ .

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- **5** If I is a CJ inference with premise S and  $o(S,\pi)$  has Cantor Normal Form  $\omega^{\alpha_0}+\cdots+\omega^{\alpha_n}$ , then  $o(I,\pi)=\omega^{\alpha_0+1}$ .
- **6** If S is the conclusion of inference I, and l and k are the maximum degrees of all CUTs and CJ inferences below S and the premises of I, respectively, then  $o(S,\pi)=\omega_{k-l}(o(I,\pi))$ .

For  $\pi$  a proof with end-sequent S we take  $o(\pi)=o(S,\pi)$ . All that is left to do now is show that whenever we apply one of our reduction procedures, the ordinal corresponding to our proof decreases. But this is just bookkeeping.

## References

Paolo Mancosu, Sergio Galvan, and Richard Zach. *An Introduction to Proof Theory: Normalization, Cut-Elimination, and Consistency Proofs.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021.